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INTRODUCTION
The Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COPl5) to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held
in Copenhagen in December 2009, made clear that international climate governance is in turmoil. Given its weak outcome, as reflected in
the Copenhagen Accord,I alternatives to a "global deal" based on a topdown approach are starting to regain legitimacy. 2 In the absence of a
* Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (SciencesPo). Ms. Domingos holds Bachelor and Master degrees in International Relations from Pontificia Universidade Catolica de Sao Paulo and Sciences Po. In 2010, Ms. Domingos was a
Visiting Scholar at the London School of Economics. The author presented an earlier version of this paper on a panel at the 2nd UNITAR-Yale Conference on Environmental
Governance and Democracy at Yale Law School on September 17, 2010. The author would
like to thank CAPES Foundation for the financial support, and Tancrede Voituriez and
Randall S. Abate for their advice and input during the preparation of this paper. Remaining errors are, of course, mine.
1. Climate Change Conference of the Parties, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-19, 2009,
Copenhagen Accord, art. 6, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter
Copenhagen Accord], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/copl5/eng/1laOl.pdf#
page=4.pdf.
2. Robert Faulkner, Hannes Stephan & John Vogler, International Climate
Policy after Copenhagen: Towards a 'Building Blocks' Approach, GLOBAL POLIcy 252
(2010), availableat http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/J.1758-5899.2010.00045.x/pdf;
("From a review of the history of the "global deal" strategy from Rio (1992) to Kyoto (1997)
and beyond we conclude that this approach has been producing diminishing returns for
some time, and that it is time to consider an alternative path-if not goal-for climate
policy. The alternative that, in our view, is most likely to move the world closer towards a
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global climate treaty, concerns with the unequal costs of emission reductions remain an extra obstacle to advancing negotiations within the
UNFCCC framework.
In particular, proposals from the United States (U.S.) and the
European Union (EU) relating to carbon taxes before Copenhagen increased tensions between developed and developing countries.
Considering potential conflicts between trade and climate regimes,
emerging countries (so called BICS or BASIC) have been highly skeptical of integrating trade dimensions into the post-Kyoto agreement,
with China taking the lead in contesting any attempt to link these issues. As a key member of the BASIC countries and a traditional
defender of multilateralism, Brazil's visions are less documented and
merit further consideration. What are Brazil's perceived threats and
opportunities regarding the interface between trade and climate regime? Through this question, this paper addresses how these
preferences could affect the emerging trade and climate governance
challenges.
Based on sixteen (16) interviews,8 direct observation, 4 and the
analysis of relevant literature,5 this paper determines that countries
have made only minimal progress in addressing possible governance
gaps between climate and trade rules. As a traditional proponent of an
international order based on respect for the rule of law,6 Brazil may
working international climate regime is a 'building blocks' approach, which develops
different elements of climate governance in an incremental fashion and embeds them in an
international political framework. This alternative . .. is already emerging in international
politics.").
3. See infra Annex: List of Interviews. Most of the interviews were held in Geneva,
but some were conducted by telephone with stakeholders based in Washington, London,
Brasilia, Sao Paulo and Paris.
4. As a delegate at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, the author was
able to get impressions of the general dynamics of the negotiations, collect useful
documents, and establish contacts with key negotiators involved in the climate dynamics.
5. Moreover, the author's analysis was complemented by the conclusions of a closed
meeting organized at Sciences-Po by the Centre for European Studies in the presence of
WTO-Director General Pascal Lamy and the Head of DG environment of European
Commission, Karl Falkenberg entitled: "How Actors Behave in Trade and Climate Change
Negotiations?" Paris, July 2010.
6. Maria Regina Soares de Lima, Emergence on Global Stage leaves Brazilians
Divided, SPIEGAL ONLINE INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 8, 2008, http://www.soigel.de/internationall
world/0,1518,582861,00.html (Recognizing that Brazil's foreign policy has two important
legacies. The first is the primacy of development over political and military goals in the
shaping of foreign policy, while the second is a strong attachment to multilateralism. In this
case, multilateral arenas were prioritized because of the country's limited capacity, but also
because of Brazil's support for a series of normative principles closely associated with
multilateralism, namely self-determination, nonintervention, and respect for international
law).

2011

CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE REGIMES

241

become a normative force capable of impacting the debate on the climate and trade interface despite not being an economic global
superpower. Brazil's attempt to play a "cooperative role" and shape
international rules in a systematic manner, are two central reasons for
this conclusion. Part I of this paper provides an overview of the main
issues involved in the climate and trade regimes. Part II discusses the
nature of Brazil's concerns and how its delegation in Copenhagen tried
to address this topic. Part III concludes that the climate and trade interface could impose significant political limits on the BASIC countries
as a coalition.
I. AN OVERVIEW

OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE INTERFACE

Analysis suggesting that the actual state of the global climate
regime, mainly represented by the Kyoto Protocol, may be on a "collision course"'7 with the global trade policy regime, giving rise to a new
set of concerns among policy-makers and analysts of global governance
issues. The central reason for preoccupation is under the climate regime, there are no specific trade measures; nonetheless, some of the
measures that are taken to implement the protocol could overlap with
WTO rules.8 The points that are the most relevant in this regard include: a) how trade measures aimed at non-parties to the protocol will
occur; b) how to deal with trade measures taken by parties to the protocol to achieve its aims, but which are not specified in the text and; c)
which body of dispute settlement body should prevail between the
WTO and the UNFCCC?9

More specifically, the trade and climate debate gained momentum between the 13th (COP13) and the 15th Conference of the Parties
(COP15) when certain factors drew the attention of policy-makers and
industrial representatives for the risks of trade distortion. Proposals
from the European Commissiono, Australia, and most importantly,
7.

Jeffrey Frankel, Global Environmental Policy and Global Trade Policy, (HARv.
Working Paper No. 08-14, 2008)
[hereinafter Frankel], available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edulfiles/Frankel2Web2.
pdf.
8. Climate Change, Competitiveness and Trade, Chatham House Rep. (Royal House of
Int'l Affairs) (June 2007),[hereinafter Climate Change] available at www.iisd.org/ydf/2007/
climate trade competitive.pdf.
9. Id.
10. John Lichfield, Can He Fix It? Sarkozy's Carbon-Tax Plan Derided by
Environmentalist, THE INDEPENDENT, Sep. 11, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/europe/can-he-fix-it-sarkozy's-carbontax-plan-derided-by-environmentalists-1785452.
html. (Announcing Nicolas Sarkozy's intention for France to apply a carbon tax: "President
Sarkozy insisted, however, that the carbon tax or "climate contribution" would put France
KENNEDY SCH. & NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON.RESEARCH,
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several bills pending in the U.S. Congress regarding the design of their
domestic climate policies were key examples."
One of the main concerns has been carbon leakage, "whereby
emission reduction efforts in one country would be offset by emission
reduction efforts in non-carbon constrained regions." 12 In addition,
"[c]ountries with higher carbon prices may seek to impose additional
border taxes on imports from countries with lower carbon prices . . . to

offset the competitiveness disadvantage to their firms and the 'leakage'
of carbon emissions in the form of increased production in countries
with lower carbon prices."13
One of the most adequate methods to address competitiveness
concerns is to achieve international agreement on an approach to combating climate change, promote broad participation in any
international regime, and ensure that different modes of national implementation do not unfairly tilt the playing field in anyone's favor. 1 4
This is easier said than done. Even if there are several possible interactions between climate and trade, the institutional relation of the
UNFCCC with the WTO has received little attention.15 It was not until 2003 that the UNFCCC Secretariat considered the state of the
negotiations in the WTO as relevant for the climate regime.16 In fact,
one commentator has noted that "mutual ignorance" and "hostility"

on track to fulfill its promise to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions to a quarter of their
present levels in the next 40 years. In theory, the taxes will grow steeper in the years ahead
but the proposals are already contested by two-thirds of French voters and by many
politicians on the left and within the President's own centre-right party. Mr. Sarkozy wants,
in the first stage, to impose a tax of 17 (915) per ton of carbon dioxide on all forms of
energy, except electricity").
11. See generally, Leveling the Carbon Playing Field, InternationalCompetition and
US Climate Policy Design, Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ. (World Resources Ints.) (May 2008),
[hereinafter, Leveling the Carbon Playing Field], available at http://pdf.wri.org/leveling
the carbon playing-field.pdf.
12. Trade, Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage: Challenges and Opportunities,
Energy, Environment and Development Programme Paper, (Chatham House) (Jan. 2009),
available at http: / / www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files / 13251 0109reinaud.pdf.
13. AadityaMattoo et al., Reconciling Climate and Trade Policy, (Peterson Inst. for
Int'l Econ.WorkingPaperNo. 09-15, 2009) [hereinafter Reconciling Climate]; available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp09-15.pdf. A detailed analysis of the impacts of
asymmetrical climate mitigation policies and legal compatibility of the UNFCCC and the
WTO is beyond the scope of this paper. (alteration in original).
14. Climate Change, supra note 8.
15. Harro van Asselt, Dealing with the Fragmentationof Global Climate Governance:
Legal and Political Approaches in Interplay Management, (The Global Governance Project,
Working Paper, Paper No. 30, 2007), available at http://www.glogov.org/images/doc/WP30.
pdf.
16. Id.
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have been characterizing the relationship between the trade and climate communities. 17
According to Ghosh, from the viewpoint of developing countries,
the inevitable linkage between climate change and trade offers both
attracts and threatens at the same time. There are four critical concerns regarding the legality and the governance of trade measures to
combat climate change. The first is disguised protectionism. Second,
labeling requirements and standards, which are outside of the WTO's
regulatory scope, are also important. In this case, he gives the example of private business, which is excluded from the WTO's Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement.' 8 Third, asymmetrical and disproportionate relaxation of trade barriers could benefit developed
countries at the expense of developing countries. Lastly, developing
countries generally link their emissions reductions to technology
transfer. 19
In order to improve trade policy monitoring in the context of
carbon leakage, industrial competitiveness and market access, all of
which are key fundamental fears, Ghosh also suggests five points: a)
recognize capacity challenges for monitoring trade measures; b)
strengthen WTO Monitoring of Protectionism Measures; c) define categories for environmental goods and services clearly; d) overcome
measurement challenges of embodied carbon across the supply chain;
and e) build developing countries' capacity to monitor emissions.
Equally, another necessary reform would be to strengthen the notification process by requiring countries to notify the WTO of climaterelated measures prior to implementing them. As Ghosh states: "It
will be impossible to address many of these concerns unless transparent, effective, and fair monitoring systems are put into place." 20
Despite the relevance of these recommendations, the reality is that little progress has been made on any of these points. In recognition of the
potential legal conflicts, the WTO and UNEP joined forces and decided
to release a report entitled: "Trade and Climate Change." One key argument in this report is that "border adjustment measures" (or border
17. Patrick Messerlin, Climate Change and Trade Policy: From Mutual Destruction to
Mutual Support, (The Grouped'EconomieMondiale A Sciences Po.,Working Paper, 2010),
available at http://www.gem.sciences-po.fr/content/publications/pdflMesserlin-Climate
Trade042010.pdf.
18. Arunabha Ghosh, Enforcing Climate Rules with Trade Measures - Five
recommendations for Trade Policy Monitoring in, CLIMATE FINANCE: REGULATORY AND
FUNDING STRATEGIES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT272-280

Kingsbury & Rudyk, ed., NYU Press 2009).

19.
20.

Id.
Id.

(Stewart,

244

FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW

Vol. 6:2:239

taxes) might be consistent with the WTO law if several conditions
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are met.
Regardless of aiming at better institutional cooperation, this study
reveals that this initiative between the WTO and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) provoked political discord among
developing countries, particularly expressed by China and India. According to a member of the WTO Secretariat: "[T]he report was very
badly received. China even declared that the people responsible for
that at the WTO should not even get their paychecks!" 21
These vehement declarations suggest that even with little empirical evidence of carbon leakage, 2 2 this issue is very sensitive and
politically controversial as it relates to economic competitiveness.
Here, governments are concerned about exposing their industries in
highly energy intensive sectors to unfair competition with industries in
non-regulated regions. In the end, several interviewees indicated that
the WTO privately recognized that the report was released at an inappropriate time. However, the fact that parties are falling short on
delivering an ambitious and legally binding climate regime largely explains why fears of trade retaliation against climate laggards is now
increasing.
Since the WTO is a member-driven organization, the Secretariat is often in a precarious position. While the Secretariat is expected
to act quickly in case of members' complaints, the controversy involving carbon taxes has been a difficult one. As one commentator from the
Secretariat noted: "Carbon taxes are not being seriously discussed by
anybody at the moment, with the exception of few Nordic countries
which are concerned with the problem of carbon leakage." 23
An important inquiry is to determine to what extent trade meacan
be used for climate mitigation purposes? In this sense, the
sures
free-rider problem is accompanied by concerns about competitiveness
and the methods that governments choose to implement their Kyoto
commitments. 24 The design of these trade measures is more appropri21. Interview with Member, Secretariat, World Trade Organization, in Geneva (July
2010) (alteration in original).
22. See, e.g., Leveling the Carbon Playing Field, supra note 11 and Reconciling
Climate, supra note 13 (indicating that empirical evidence of carbon leakage is not
prominent and, therefore, administrative complexity would probably not pay off border
adjustments benefits.) Butsee, e.g., Frankel supra note 7 (emphasizing that the OECD has
estimated larger estimates of leakage in the context of the EU, since it is the only region
applying carbon taxes domestically through the European Emissions trade scheme (ETS).
23. Interview with Member, Secretariat, World Trade Organization, in Geneva (July
2010).
Climate Change, supra note 8.
24.
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ate to be addressed than the question of legal compatibility. 2 5 Thus,
the real challenge for policy makers is to take care when choosing
among the options and maintain a stable relationship between the
UNFCCC and the WTO process. Nevertheless, given the strong disinterest from both developed and developing countries, gaps in the
trade and climate governance might get wider. Here, another interview
at the WTO Secretariat is highly illustrative of the state of this issue in
the trade arena: "IT]he debate is indeed happening, but in the corridors. No one wants to make it official on the current agenda." 2 6

II.

BRAZIL'S VIEWS ON CLIMATE AND TRADE:
THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY?

During COPl5, more general concerns with trade gained force

among the BASIC countries.
"Emerging economies do not want to take firm commitments on cutting emissions if they are not reassured on the way their exports to
the developed countries will be treated in the future. Developed
countries do not want to take firm commitments on cutting emissions if they are not reassured on the way their imports from
developing countries could be treated in the future". 27
As indicated in the previous section, the central message of the
WTO-UNEP report indicates that border measures to address asymmetric mitigation does not necessarily violate the WTO law. However,
for the Permanent Brazilian delegation to the WTO and industrial rep-

resentatives at the Brazilian delegation in Copenhagen, there is great
concern. 28 The climate and trade interface gained force from COP13
onwards and should follow three axes, two directly related to the
UNFCCC negotiations and one linked to the Doha Round. The one related to the Doha Round is controversial and makes reference to the
debate on the liberalization of environmental goods and services
(EGS). Paralyzed by definitional challenges, this negotiation process is
often perceived by Brazilian diplomats as a "cynic discussion".
Clean technology transfer and the use of subsidies and trade
measures in order to address competitiveness disadvantages from
25. Id.
26. Interview with Member, Secretariat, World Trade Organization, in Geneva (July
2010) (alteration in original).
27. See Messerlin, supra note 17.
28. Interview with Brazilian diplomat, Member, Permanent Mission of Brazil to the
WTO, in Geneva (July 2010) (noting "[Tihe Brazilian official position understands the
interface of the climate and trade regimes as a problem with the dispute settlement
mechanism to the WTO and gives high importance to that.")
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large energy intensive industries are a focus of the discussion among
the UNFCCC parties. The issue of technology transfer is not new and
is highly permeated by the intellectual property rights discussion. 29
More recently the debates concerning the use of domestic subsidies,
free emissions allowances and technological subsidies are three examples of trade measures as potential methods to distort trade and
undermine developing countries' development.30
Three proposals were on the table in Copenhagen. 31 The first,
derived from the United States and supported by the EU, confirmed
the United States' resistance to address trade aspects in the climate
regime. This proposal, which simply replicated the approach involved
in GATT Article XX, did not address developing countries' concerns regarding "green protectionism." The second proposal was from India,
which forbids any type of unilateral trade border measures, whether
tariff related or not. Supported by China, the Indian proposal was
classified as discriminatory because it suggested a clear distinction between developed and developing countries, which harms the "most
favoured Nation" principle from the WTO. 3 2 Moreover, the Indian text
intended to use the term "emission linkage," which Brazil considered
controversial due to difficulties in measurement and lack of empirical
evidence.
In Brazil's view, both proposals were inadequate. As a representative of an industrial coalition explained: "[Tihe Indian proposal was
considered too radical, principally for Brazil which has an advanced
and rigid environmental legislation that the private sector already
pays highly for it.""3 In this sense, the U.S. border taxes could represent a comparative advantage against China and India, since the
29. Diego Z. Bonomo, Carolina Lembo & Antonio Meirelles Neto, Clima e comdrcio apos
o encontro de Copenhague, Valor Economico, May 28, 2010, availableat http://www.valoron
line.com.br/impresso/opiniao/98/119452/clima-e-comercio-apos-o-encontro-de-copenhague.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. World Trade Organization, Principles of the Trading System, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/fact2 e.htm ("MOST-FAVOURED-NATION (MFN): TREATING
OTHER PEOPLE EQUALLY. Under the WTO agreements, countries cannot normally

discriminate between their trading partners. Grant someone a special favour (such as a
lower customs duty rate for one of their products) and you have to do the same for all other
WTO members. This principle is known as most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment. It is so
important that it is the first article of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
which governs trade in goods. MFN is also a priority in the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) (Article 2) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) (Article 4), although in each agreement the principle is handled
slightly differently. Together, those three agreements cover all three main areas of trade
handled by the WTO.")
33. Interview with a representative from industry. August, 2010.
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trade barriers would only be applied for those who do not have "comparable measures" in their territories. So Brazil in Copenhagen was in
limbo: it did not know it should feel threatened or ambitious.
The third proposal was drafted by Brazil in an attempt to balance the two previous visions. Described as the "most balanced" of the
proposals, the proposal seeks to implement the Convention while considering existent obligations under the WTO. In this sense, the
objective was to send a "political signal" to the WTO regarding the
need to address possible conflicts between trade and climate rules. In
practice, Brazil tried to complement Article 3.5 of the Convention by
formulating the following paragraph:
"Taking into account the relevant provisions of the Convention and
further recognizing the principle enshrined in Article 3, paragraph
5, agrees that Parties in the pursuit of the objective and implementation of the Convention, shall not resort to any measures, in
particular unilateral fiscal or non-fiscal measures applied on the
border, against goods and services imported from Parties, that constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade."3 4
For Brazil, the relevant aspect was to incorporate a clause that
could highlight the risks of border measures for developing countries.
Aiming at opening a legal precedent in the climate regime, Brazil considered the importance of providing guidance to the appellate body at
the WTO in case of future disputes in the WTO. In this case, border
taxes were judged by Brazil as the most "alarming" issue at that specific time. At the same time, one relevant explanatory factor for this
concern is the substantial presence of representatives of the private
sector in the Brazilian delegation in Copenhagen. With almost 800
members, this country had the largest delegation at COPl5.
Overall, there are signs that Brazil's proposals in Copenhagen
are in concert with its perceptions of opportunities and costs related to
biofuels. Being so complex and permeated by heavy political connotation, "[agriculture, which is one of the sectors most vulnerable to
climate change, is also a key sector for international trade through
subsidies to bad fertilizers, bad feedstock for animals, subsidies to
dedicated energy crops to replace fossil fuel use, improved energy efficiency, etc."3 5
34. UNFCCC, Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the
Convention, available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/ad-hoc-working-groups/1calitems/4381.
php.
35. Gabrielle Marceau, The WTO and Climate Finance: Overview of the Key Issuesin
,CLIMATE FINANCE: REGULATORY AND FUNDING STRATEGIES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 247-253 (Stewart, Kingsbury & Rudyk, ed., NYU Press 2009).
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In this context, the Brazilian sugarcane industry association
(UNICA) is a central stakeholder not only ih Brazil, but also internationally. In their view, ethanol should be part of the flexible
mechanisms such as carbon emissions trading under the climate
change negotiations. As Nelson explains:
"[It was not part of the discussion in Kyoto because the only country that produced ethanol in significant quantities was Brazil.
Because it was not part of the discussion, there are no carbon credits for ethanol. Brazil does receive credits from bioelectricity, which
is ethanol and other biofuels converted into electricity to power a
small battery. Those bioelectricity credits represent twenty percent
of the credits Brazil receives today."3 6
To illustrate, on the occasion of a visit of WTO-Director General Pascal
Lamy in Brazil, UNICA's President (Mr. Jank) declared that it made
"no sense for countries to adopt ambitious policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while continuing to apply high tariffs on clean
technologies that can be instrumental to achieve reduction goals and
allowing fossil fuels to be traced freely."3 7
This declaration shows that Brazil is not only promoting ethanol in the climate change negotiations, but also is equally determined
to include ethanol into the context of the negotiations of EGS in the
context of the Doha Round. For Brazil, biofuels are an efficient manner to advance "green growth" and evolve into low-carbon economy.
However, the EGS negotiations have had little success as they have
been paralyzed by definitional problems. Brazil perceives this negotiation negatively by believing that only EGS items of developed countries
are part of this negotiation agenda.

III.

TRADE AND CLIMATE: A SHIFT IN VALUES?

In Bali at COP13, trade ministers informally discussed trade
and climate issues in the context of the UNFCCC for the first time. By
exploring the dynamics of the meeting through interviews, two interesting points are worth noting. The first is a normative shift between
trade and climate values and the second is a partial explanation for
such discontentment among developing countries regarding the EGS
list. Organized as an informal meeting, the debate was dominated by
the proposal from the EU and the U.S. for all WTO Members to liber36. ANA JANAINA NELSON, CLIMATE CHANGE AND BIOFUELs 3. Brazil Institute Special
Report, Wildrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, (2009) (alteration in original).
37. Ethanol: To Tariff or Not to Tariff? Trade & Environment - Bridges at 23 (Feb. Apr. 2010), availableat http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridges/bridgesl4-2.pdf.
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alize forty-three (43) products identified by the World Bank as climatefriendly goods. As mentioned, Brazil's reaction was to vehemently criticize the EU-US list for not including ethanol.3 8
As explained by one of the interviewees, when Pascal Lamy
opened the meeting he declared that the WTO was ready to cooperate
with the UNFCCC. This declaration in itself was judged as a fundamental change in paradigm given the traditional lack of cooperation
with the UNFCCC. Interestingly, interviews revealed that, at that occasion, the EGS list was the main contribution from the trade
community to the climate change negotiations. As someone present at
the meeting tells, the reaction of Brazil was very negative but had a
significant impact:
Celso Amorim (the Brazilian Foreign Minister) took the floor and
criticized the document arguing that: a) Brazil did not recognize the
list and did not know from where it came from; b) since it did not
include ethanol, Brazil could not accept such proposition. Finally,
Amorim's third point was interesting for surprising all delegates. In
articulation with the Pakistani ambassador and in a very 'improvised way', Brazil declared that would not be interesting in
negotiat[ing] an agreement on climate change that would not include a review of the TRIPS agreement. His declaration put a 'chill
in the room since it was the first time that an idea like that was put
on the table. Everyone was shocked because to require the revision
of TRIPS is huge, particularly on that context. I think, Brazil's position at this meeting reflected the immaturity of the debate and how
the Brazilian foreign ministry was probably trying to get time.
However, what was interesting was that, on the next day, the meeting 'turned' on the other way around. Instead of contributing
actively, it was agreed that the WTO should support the UNFCCC
and stay aside. The clear message was that countries need to decide
what they are going to do under the UNFCC, while the WTO 'wait
and see'."3 9
This quotation indicates a normative shift in perspective on hierarchy between trade and climate. This means that, unlike the past,
it is widely recognized that trade should not be above climate on a scale
of values. If some analysts suggested that the unsatisfactory outcomes
from Copenhagen resulted from difficulties at concluding the Doha
Round, today it is possible to affirm that the climate regime precedes
the trade one in terms of legal precedent. In other words: "[G]iven that
few proposals regarding climate mitigation, particularly in the U.S.,
says that 'comparability of efforts' is a central challenge to determine
38. Id.
39. Interview with Member, Secretariat, World Trade Organization, in Geneva (July
2010) (alteration in original).
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who pays or not for the border taxes, in case of conflict, the peace
clause will probably be the climate regime and its understandings of
"common but differentiated responsibilities." 40
In addition, interviews revealed why and how developing countries became highly skeptical about the EGS list. As my research
shows, in reality, what became the official proposal of the U.S. and of
the EU during the trade and climate meeting in Bali corresponded to
an existing sub-list of the OECD, which was revised by the World Bank
and published later as a report. The problem was that such list had
already been rejected by the developing countries. Since the Copenhagen Accord does not address the links between trade and climate and
the EGS negotiations are relatively paralyzed, the debate remains
unresolved.
Brazilian foreign policy has traditionally been perceived as conciliatory. In this sense, one remarkable goal of Brazil's policies is to be
perceived as a political "bridge" in the eyes of the international community. As a former non-Brazilian diplomat noted:
"The Brazilian negotiation capacity in multilateral negotiations is
very high. So the real question that we need to pose is to know who
has, in the end, the ability to cause a real impact. It seems to me
that India and Egypt, while also very supportive of multilateralism,
don't have the same capacity of Brazil. In my view, Brazil's strength
relies on its aptitude to constantly have a systemic and global view.
That is its real asset."4 1
The importance of Brazil at the WTO is a relevant aspect. Brazil was even cited as a "superpower" during interviews. Three major
reasons emerged to explain Brazil's rise at this organization. First, the
victories in winning relevant panels against hegemonic players at the
WTO (i.e., the cotton case against the U.S.) gave significant legitimacy
to Brazil's legal and political capacity. Secondly, Brazil's leadership
during the creation of the agriculture G-20 allowed a significant rupture with a clear cut North-South division at this organization.
Consequently, Brazil is today recognized as an important player and
even a technical reference to least developed countries. 4 2 Third,
"[Birazil has been a very responsible player and it is even behaving as
a superpower in the WTO. Everyone listens to it and it is a leader here.
40. Interview with Brazilian diplomat, Member, Permanent Mission of Brazil to the
WTO, in Geneva (July 2010) (alteration in original).
41. Interview with Member, ICSTD, in Geneva (July 2010).
42. As indicated by another member of the WTO Secretariat, "I have observed several
times Brazil giving advice and assisting least developed countries."

2011

CLIMATE CHANGE AND TRADE REGIMES

251

It is also being very helpful and ready to compromise (in reference to
the Ministerial meeting in 2008)."43
Despite these positive views regarding Brazil's assertiveness
and diplomatic capacity, this country is largely dependent on coalition
building as a way of guaranteeing its interests. A crucial example is
the leading role of Brazil on the creation of the G20 before the WTO
Ministerial meeting in Cancun (2003) in order to increase its leverage
in this organization. However, "the ministerial meeting on trade in
2008 showed that Brazil does not go anywhere alone." 44 Here, the clash
with India over the special safeguard mechanism (SSM) is illustrative. 4 5 While at the WTO this country is perceived as a coalition
leader, this is not true in the climate arena, which is dominated by
China's views. In this context, this section highlights one key aspect
often neglected by the analysts; the degree of coherence among the
great emerging countries themselves. As one diplomat declared:
The inevitable rise of the great emerging countries, in reality,
brought a great confusion, because the South lost conceptual coherence in relation to their normative visions of how the global order
should look like.

.

. Obviously, these countries must allocate their

best resources to deal with the most pressing issues and the G77,
for example, were left aside. Copenhagen illustrated how some radical countries could challenge the climate negotiations. If the
Copenhagen accord was negotiated at closed doors, is also because
no agreement would come out with the G-77 on board. 4 6
At the Copenhagen summit, Brazil's trade proposals were supported by South Africa, which had a negotiator previously serving at
the WTO. A Brazilian delegate involved in the negations noted, "China
also supported us, but it refused in the end because the Brazilian proposal neither had a clear North-South division nor mentioned the
articles related to the obligation of developed countries to transfer
technology to developing countries."4 7 Further, the content of the Copenhagen Accord annexes display the discrepancy between Brazil and
China's actual commitments. While Brazil provided ambitious mitigation figures and targets, in line with Intergovernmental Panel on
43. Interview with Member, Secretariat, World Trade Organization, in Geneva (July
2010) (alteration in original).
44. Interview with Member, Secretariat, World Trade Organization, in Geneva (July
2010).
45. WTO News, http://www.wto.org/english/news e/news08_e/meetO8_summary-30
july-e.htm#ssm. [last visited Sep.10, 2010].
46. Interview with Brazilian diplomat, Member, Permanent Mission of Brazil to the
WTO, in Geneva (July 2010).
47. Id.
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Climate Change (IPCC) suggestions, China adhered to its national
objectives with no comparable metrics with IPCC suggestions. Hence,
internal tensions among BASIC members seem to be looming on both
areas of negotiations.
With respect to the trade and climate change nexus, China is
relentlessly vocal, threatening to sue at the WTO any Annex I country
taxing imports on climate change grounds. Brazil adopted a less aggressive stance by recalling the need not to depart from the GATT
objectives to liberalize trade and avert discrimination, as shown above.
The marginal difference between the two stances can be explained by
the export structures of the two countries. China is mostly hurt by EU
or U.S. carbon tariffs on carbon intensive products such as steel, iron
and cement. Brazil's and China's exports could become more substitutable in the near future, along with the transformation (and shift
toward value added products) of the export structures of these countries. The current peace clause between Brazil, China, and India on
trade issues rests on the complementary pattern of trade, whereby
Brazil specializes on agricultural exports, China on manufacture, and
India on services. Recent dissent between Brazil and China on the unfair trade advantage grabbed by China, thanks to its undervalued
Yuan, suggests that export structures are evolving toward less and less
complementarities.
Further analysis is required to better assess how the great
emerging countries are impacting global governance and to what extent their discourses could be applied in practice. 48 Contrary to
enthusiasts of the South-South cooperation approach, some argue that
Brazilian contemporary politics is proof of an "illusion and a great naivetM."49 The main reason for this assertion is the erroneous perception
that, because of similar challenges, emerging countries would automatically and mutually reinforce each other. In particular, this paper
suggests that what the interface of trade and climate regimes may expose is the fragility of the political arrangements among the great
emerging countries. In this case, despite Brazil's relative success at
the WTO, it is now being overshadowed by the Chinese. Recently incorporated as a member of the WTO, China is efficiently "playing the
48. AMANCio JORGE NUNES DE OLVEIu & JANINA ONUKI & EMANUEL DE OLVEIRA.
COALIZOEs SUL-SUL e multilateralismo: paises intermediarios e o caso IBAS. [South-South
coalitions and multilateralim: intermediate countries and the cases of IBAS] In Brasil,
India e Africa do Sul -Desaflos e oportunidades para novas parcerias. [Brazil, India and
South Africa-Challenge and opportunities for new partnerships]. Maria Regina Soares de
Lima e Monica Hirst (Org.) Publisher Paz e Terra (2009).
49. Interview with Brazilian diplomat, Member, Permanent Mission of Brazil to the
WTO, in Geneva (July 2010).
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game." It is now clear that this country has (paradoxically) fully integrated itself into the system by increasing exponentially its knowledge
of WTO law and procedures. For some, the difference between Brazil
and China is that Brazil probably "overplays its role."
CONCLUSION

The temptation to use trade measures to offset competitiveness
losses will grow as parties consider more stringent targets under future commitment periods or successors to the Kyoto Protocol. Given
the impasse over the future climate regime, the interface between
trade and climate, paradoxically, lost momentum. For some analysts,
economic downturn (and consequently reduced greenhouse gas emissions), accompanied by the setback of the North American bills slowed
the urgency of this debate. However, this paper maintains that, in the
long term, trade and climate regimes could lead to counterproductive
measures.
As a traditional player in the contemporary trade negotiations
and on environmental governance, Brazil's diplomatic tradition tends
to advocate against economic asymmetries and political inequality. In
this context, concerns with new forms of protectionism, such as illegal
subsidies and non-technical barriers, continue to be at the core of Brazil's concerns. In its view, the biggest risk is to undermine well
consolidated multilateral trade rules, especially in the tariffs area,
through illegal border adjustments. This threat is particularly evident
in light of the degree of uncertainty regarding the evolving nature of
both regimes and the deadlock of the UNFCCC process and the Doha
Round.
Brazil's normative preferences were relevant for alerting and
trying to address possible future gaps between the UNFCCC and WTO
during the Copenhagen Summit. Even if less vocal than China and
India, Brazil's tactics have been coherent with its traditional attachment to a rule-based international system and to the relevance of the
Dispute Settlement mechanism of the WTO to Brazil's trade policies.
The WTO is often perceived in Brazil either as an organization
that limits domestic public policy making or as a forum to reduce international asymmetries. Despite a general continuity in Brazil's foreign
policy, President Lula had a tendency to personify Brazilian diplomacy
and promote "autonomy" as a principle. In this case, this government
tried to affirm Brazil's national interests in an assertive manner, undertake collective action with other countries from the South, and work
towards a better international status by forming regional power poles
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as a manner to create balance and democratize international order.50
With a new President to take office in 2011, it remains to be seen how
Brazil will be perceived by the international community and how it intends to build political alliances. What the analysis of the climate and
trade interface shows is how the alliance of the BASIC countries as a
political coalition is more fragile than usual. In this regard, there are
reasons to believe that the climate and trade interface could put into
evidence significant political limits around the BASIC countries as a
coalition. The paradoxical term "competitive cooperation" illustrates
the current state of multilateral negotiations on climate change, in
which diffused leadership and new power relations have become an extra hurdle.
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